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DOCTORAL STUDIES Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2026
DISSERTATION: “Essays in Econometrics”

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

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PRIOR EDUCATION Brown University 2018
B.S. Computer Science, B.S. Mathematics (*magna cum laude*)

CITIZENSHIP USA, Switzerland **GENDER:** Female

FIELDS Primary Field: Econometrics, Statistics
Secondary Fields: Development, Experimental

MIT Economics

RECA SARFATI
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE	MIT	
	14.386 - New Econometric Methods (PhD) Teaching Assistant to Alberto Abadie and Anna Mikusheva	2026
	14.39/390 - Large-Scale Decision Making and Inference Teaching Assistant to Isaiah Andrews	2025
	14.381 - Estimation & Inference of Linear Models (PhD Core II) Teaching Assistant to Whitney Newey	2022-24
	14.380 - Statistical Methods in Economics (PhD Core I) Teaching Assistant to Ashesh Rambachan	2024
	14.76/760 - Firms, Markets, Trade, and Growth Teaching Assistant to David Atkin and Dave Donaldson	2023
	14.009 - Economics and Society's Greatest Problems Teaching Assistant to Esther Duflo	2022
	BROWN UNIVERSITY	
	CSCI 1915K - Algorithmic Game Theory Teaching Assistant to Amy Greenwald	2018
	CSCI 1570 - Design and Analysis of Algorithms Teaching Assistant to Paul Valiant	2017
	CSCI 0160 - Intro to Algorithms and Data Structures Teaching Assistant to Seny Tamara	2017
	PLCY 2455 - Statistics for Public Policy (MPA) Teaching Assistant to John Friedman	2016
	PLCY 2460 - Microeconomics for Public Policy (MPA) Teaching Assistant to Emily Oster	2016
RELEVANT POSITIONS	President, MIT Graduate Economics Association	2022-24
	Research Analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Macroeconomic and Monetary Studies	2018-20
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	Best Graduate Teaching Assistant, <i>MIT Dept. of Economics</i>	2025
	Graduate Research Fellowship, <i>National Science Foundation</i>	2020-26
	Phi Beta Kappa & Sigma Xi, <i>Brown University</i>	2018
	Women of Computer Science '84 Undergraduate Teaching Assistant Award, <i>Brown University</i> .	2017

PUBLICATIONS **“Online Estimation of DSGE Models,”** *The Econometrics Journal*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, January 2021. (with Michael Cai, Marco Del Negro, Edward Herbst, Ethan Matlin, and Frank Schorfheide). [[Paper](#)]

CONFERENCE PAPERS **“Estimating HANK for Central Banks,”** *Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics: Implications for Monetary Policy, 1st ed. Central Bank of Chile, 2024*. (with Sushant Acharya, Marco Del Negro, Ethan Matlin, William Chen, Keshav Dogra, Shlok Goyal, Donggyu Lee, Sikata Sengupta). [[Paper](#)]

“Hindsight and Sequential Rationality of Correlated Play,” *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, May 2021. (with Morrill, Ryan D'Orazio, Marc Lanctot, James R Wright, Amy Greenwald, Michael Bowling). [[Paper](#)]

RESEARCH PAPERS **“Post Pre-Analysis Plans: Valid Inference for Non-Preregistered Specifications” (Job Market Paper)** (with Vod Vilfort) [[Latest Draft](#)] [[arXiv](#)]

Pre-analysis plans (PAPs) have become standard in experimental economics research, but it is nevertheless common to see researchers deviating from their PAPs to supplement preregistered estimates with non-prespecified findings. While such ex-post analysis can yield valuable insights, there is broad uncertainty over how to interpret -- or whether to even acknowledge -- non-preregistered results. In this paper, we consider the case of a truth-seeking researcher who, after seeing the data, earnestly wishes to report additional estimates alongside those preregistered in their PAP. We show that, even absent "nefarious" behavior, conventional confidence intervals and point estimators are invalid due to the fact that non-preregistered estimates are only reported in a subset of potential data realizations. We propose inference procedures that account for this conditional reporting. We apply these procedures to [Bessone et al. \(2021\)](#), which studies the economic effects of increased sleep among the urban poor. We demonstrate that, depending on the reason for deviating, the adjustments from our procedures can range from having no difference to an economically significant difference relative to conventional practice. Finally, we consider the robustness of our procedure to certain forms of misspecification, motivating possible heuristic checks and norms for journals to adopt.

“Narrative-Hacking” [\[Draft\]](#)

Economists seldom base conclusions on isolated hypothesis tests. Rather, it is common to combine multiple atomic tests in a logical structure to serve higher-order purposes, such as distinguishing between competing theories, defending causal claims, diagnosing mechanisms, and arranging disparate facts into coherent stories. These economic "narratives" are foundational to how findings are framed, interpreted, and communicated—governing a paper's overarching message and ultimate societal impact. Yet, a single set of test outcomes can support many narratives, not all of which are true. While practitioners today recognize the importance of multiple testing corrections to guard against practices such as p -hacking, these procedures target atomic errors, not those of downstream narratives built upon them. This paper presents a general model for the construction and testing of narratives that admits a formal definition of Type I "narrative error." After partitioning narratives into two classes—monotonic (e.g., impact evaluations) and non-monotonic (e.g., balance checks)—we first show a positive result: if a narrative admits a representative test that is (weakly) increasing in atomic rejections, any procedure that controls the family-wise error rate (FWER) over underlying atomic tests at level α automatically delivers uniform narrative size control at α . A corollary is a "free narrative shopping" guarantee: once atomic tests are fixed or preregistered, researchers may explore any monotone narratives *ex post* without inflating size, thereby immunizing them against potential concerns of *ex post* "narrative-hacking." We then find an impossibility result: when testing sets include non-monotone narratives—such as a set containing both a narrative and its negation—atomic FWER control cannot achieve uniform narrative size control with $\alpha < 0.5$. To accommodate arbitrary collections of narratives, we provide a novel procedure that relates uniform size control to the construction of joint confidence sets. We show this approach is necessary and sufficient for uniform narrative error control. We demonstrate practical implementation of this framework by replicating several key findings in [Dell \(2010\)](#).

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Correcting for Selection Bias from Specification Testing in Econometric Models (with Vod Vilfort)

Applied researchers routinely employ specification checks to assess whether their econometric models adequately capture the data-generating process. When specification problems are detected, researchers typically either modify their models—through variable transformations, additional controls, instrumental variables, or alternative estimation techniques—or abandon the analysis altogether. As has previously been established, this common practice of conditioning analysis on specification test outcomes constitutes a form of selective reporting that distorts the sampling distribution of reported estimators and invalidates conventional inference. I show, however, that there is a ‘free lunch’ available in this setting: By using an estimator that residualizes by specification checks, a researcher can simultaneously: (i) reduce standard errors if the model is correctly specified, (ii) ensure immunity to the aforementioned pretest bias arising from pre-tests of unknown form, and (iii) reduce the estimator's worst-case bias under local misspecification.

Inference with Selected Instruments (with Vod Vilfort)

Instrumental variable estimation often involves data-dependent selection, from discarding instruments yielding implausible estimates to the ubiquitous practice of pre-testing for instrument strength using first-stage F-statistics ([Stock & Yogo, 2005](#)). While a long literature has theoretically identified and empirically documented the resulting inference distortions ([Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox, 1996](#); [Guggenberger, 2010](#); [Andrews, Stock and Sun, 2019](#); [Young, 2022](#)), existing solutions primarily rely on sample splitting methods that sacrifice statistical power. In this early-stage project, we develop a general inference framework that remains valid after arbitrary data-dependent instrument selection. Our proposed conditional inference procedure corrects these distortions by properly accounting for the selection event while preserving the full sample for estimation. The method accommodates the nonlinear selection rules common in practice and remains robust to unknown instrument strength, while uniformly dominating sample-splitting approaches in terms of statistical power.